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Mutual Fund Attributes and Investor Behavior
Abstract I study the dynamics of investor cash flows in socially responsible mutual funds. Consistent with anecdotal evidence of loyalty, the monthly volatility of investor cash flows is lower in socially responsible funds than conventional funds. I find strong evidence that cash flows into socially responsible funds are more sensitive to lagged positive returns than cash flows into conventional funds, and weaker evidence that cash outflows from socially responsible funds are less sensitive to lagged negative returns. These results indicate that investors derive utility from the socially responsible attribute, especially when returns are positive.
Mutual fund companies continually introduce new types of funds in an effort to attract investor capital and maximize assets under management. The decision to introduce a new type of fund is affected by a number of variables, including investor demand for the fund's attributes. As argued by Khorana and Servaes (1999) , new fund types in high demand generate capital inflows and incremental revenue for the fund company.
Subsequent investor behavior, however, may affect the operating costs and viability of the new funds. If a new fund type draws myopic investors, for example, then shareholder subscription and redemption activity may be more volatile and difficult to manage. In this paper, I study a specific fund type -socially responsible equity mutual funds -in order to explore investor decision making in new funds.
According to the Social Investment Forum (2001, hereafter "SIF") , assets invested in all socially screened portfolios exceeded $2 trillion in 2001, with $136 billion invested in mutual funds, reflecting increased awareness of social responsibility and corporate ethics in the investment community. Socially responsible investing integrates personal values and societal concerns with the investment decision via shareholder activism, community investment, and, most visibly, investing with social screens. Social screens often exclude securities of companies in particular industries, as well as subjecting companies to qualitative criteria involving social or environmental causes. To illustrate, consider the Domini Social Index, which was created in 1990 by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Company, and which incorporates both exclusionary and qualitative screens. As described by Statman (2000) , securities of companies that derive two percent or more of sales from military weapons systems, derive any revenues from the manufacture of alcohol or tobacco products, or derive any revenues from the provision of gambling products or services are not eligible for inclusion in the index.
Qualitative screens include a company's record on diversity, employee relations, and the environment. CSX Corporation, for example, was dropped from the index in 1998 for a poor environmental and safety record, whereas Compuware Corporation was added in 1999 for success with a diversity program and employee relations.
Research regarding socially responsible (hereafter "SR") investing has to date focused exclusively on whether there is a difference between the performance of socially screened portfolios and that of conventional funds. In the spirit of Markowitz (1952) , social screens may constrain portfolio optimization. A natural question to address is whether these constraints are binding on performance, that is, whether the risk-adjusted returns of socially screened investment vehicles are inferior to those of conventional investments. Alternatively, social screens might serve as filters for management quality and hence generate superior risk-adjusted returns. Derwall et al. (2005) , for example, find that companies rated highly for environmental performance outperform those rated poorly. Other studies of SR investing, including Hamilton et al. (1993) , Statman (2000) , , compare the risk-adjusted returns of SR mutual funds to the riskadjusted returns of matched conventional funds and find that SR mutual funds perform no differently than conventional funds. Bauer et al. point out that in the early part of their sample, from 1990 to 1993, SR mutual funds underperformed their conventional counterparts, perhaps indicating a learning phase. Geczy et al. (2003) use a different approach to measuring performance: the Bayesian framework of Pástor and Stambaugh (2002) . Under the assumption that investors possess a diffuse prior belief about managerial ability and use the Capital Asset Pricing Model to select funds, Geczy et al. also find the performance of SR and conventional funds to be comparable. The general conclusion one can draw from existing studies is that SR mutual fund performance is not significantly different from the performance of funds that do not screen on social criteria.
Another important question -and one that has not yet been addressed by the literature -is whether the behavior of investors in SR mutual funds differs from the behavior of investors in conventional funds. Studying the behavior of SR investors is important from an industry perspective: cash flows into and out of mutual funds from shareholder subscriptions and redemptions can pose a substantial burden on fund managers, as well as passive mutual fund shareholders. For this reason, identifying sources of stable investment should be of practical interest to mutual fund companies.
Studying SR investors is also important from an academic perspective: the SR attribute provides a natural behavioral experiment. Geczy et al. (2003) report anecdotal evidence that SR investors withdrew capital at a slower rate than investors in conventional funds during the 1999 to 2001 period, suggesting that SR investors are more loyal. In this paper, I study the behavior of SR investors more comprehensively, controlling for other factors that might explain differences across SR and conventional funds.
On the one hand, investors in SR funds may have decided to invest as part of a standard risk-reward optimization. If so, then traditional asset pricing models should adequately describe the decision to initially invest in the fund, and subsequent decisions to change allocation to the fund. On the other hand, investors in SR funds may derive utility from owning the securities of companies which are consistent with a set of personal values or societal concerns. In other words, they may have a multi-attribute utility function -one that incorporates an additional aspect of their investment choice.
These investors may view investing in an SR fund as consuming the SR attribute. In order to smooth consumption of the attribute, subscription and redemption activity may be more regular in SR funds than in conventional funds. I use the net of aggregate investor subscriptions and redemptions, or fund flow, to measure shareholder activity.
Consistent with the intuition that the SR attribute smoothes allocation decisions, I find that over the 1991 to 2002 period, the monthly volatility of fund flow in SR funds is significantly lower than conventional fund flow volatility.
Studying the relation between fund flow and fund performance provides additional insight. I present several competing hypotheses regarding the manner in which the SR attribute affects investor decision making, each of which makes an empirical prediction for the flow-performance relation. I find that the sensitivity of fund flow to lagged positive returns is higher in SR funds than conventional funds. This result is consistent with both a model of rational learning, in which SR investors have more diffuse prior beliefs about the SR strategy, as well as a conditional utility function in which SR investors derive utility from consuming the SR attribute if the investment is warranted on its financial merits alone. To distinguish between the two, I measure the flow-performance and fund flow volatility separately for subsets of the sample based on fund age. If SR investor behavior is governed by a conditional utility function, then differences between SR funds and conventional funds should persist. If SR investor behavior is instead governed by rational learning, then differences between SR funds and conventional funds should disappear over time as the precision of prior beliefs converge.
I find that the differences between SR and conventional funds are significant for young and mature funds alike; hence the conditional utility function appears to capture behavior better than a model of rational learning.
I also find weaker evidence that the sensitivity of fund flow to lagged negative returns is lower in SR funds than conventional funds, indicating that the utility derived from consuming the SR attribute may mitigate the tendency to shift capital away from poorly performing SR funds. Lastly, I conduct several additional tests to ensure the robustness of the paper's main results. Statistical significance is maintained when standard errors are measured using a least absolute deviations approach, which minimizes the impact of outliers. Differences between SR and conventional funds are qualitatively consistent when measured separately across two subperiods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents competing hypotheses for the behavior of SR investors. Motivating assumptions are drawn from existing literature. In Section II, I describe the data. Section III presents the empirical methods and results. Special attention is paid to the construction of a control group. I summarize the findings in Section IV.
I. Hypothesis Development
This section develops competing hypotheses for the behavior of investors in SR funds.
Subsections A and B review the mutual fund flow-performance relation and fund flow volatility in a general setting to provide a context for the alternative hypotheses.
Subsection C lists the hypotheses, motivates them with assumptions supported by existing research, and discusses empirical predictions.
A. The Flow-Performance Relation
As argued by Jensen (1968) , a corollary of the efficient market hypothesis is that average risk-adjusted mutual fund returns should reflect only the expenses incurred in the course of managing the fund. Time series variation in mutual fund performance should be random; hence investors should not be concerned with past performance but rather with fund expenses, as these are to some extent endogenous. Prior studies of the flowperformance relation, however, report strong evidence that a mutual fund's past performance influences subsequent subscription and redemption activity. See, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Sirri and Tufano (1998) , Busse (2001) , and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) . The relation is often found to be asymmetric, such that poor performers are not punished to the same extent that strong performers are rewarded.
In the context of the efficient market hypothesis, the observed flow-performance relation is a financial anomaly. One explanation for the flow-performance anomaly is that investor actions may be driven at least in part by psychological biases. These biases can be modeled as errors in the Bayesian updating performed by investors when making an investment decision. One example is the tendency for people to simplify difficult problems by ignoring prior beliefs and acting exclusively on recent observations. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) label this the representative heuristic. The representative heuristic predicts that mutual fund investors disregard prior beliefs regarding managerial ability and instead simply subscribe to recent top performers and redeem from recent poor performers. Brav and Heaton (2002) provide an alternative explanation for the flowperformance anomaly. If a relevant feature of the economy is unobservable, e.g. managerial ability, then the anomaly can be explained by rational learning. Empirical research in the equities market has reported a long list of anomalies which some fund managers may be able to exploit on a consistent basis to generate superior returns. 1 Ippolito (1992), Lynch and Musto (2003) , and Berk and Green (2004) , among others, interpret the flow-performance relation as a reflection of investors updating their beliefs about managerial ability and expected mutual fund returns. I focus on this rational learning explanation for the flow-performance relation because it does not depend on any assumptions about specific psychological biases, for which consensus has not been reached in the literature.
B. Fund Flow Volatility
Investors subscribe to and redeem from mutual funds for at least three reasons.
First, as described above, changes in expectations of mutual fund performance may motivate investors to reallocate capital among their investments. Second, since mutual funds can be traded daily, investors may move capital in and out of them to address their liquidity needs. Third, Massa (2003) argues that investors may subscribe to or redeem from specific mutual funds in order to change their consumption of or exposure to attributes other than expected return and risk.
There are two benefits to using fund flow volatility as a measure of investor behavior. First, the volatility of monthly fund flows captures the net effect of investors' decisions without forcing any structure on the decision making process. This avoids problems associated with misspecification, though it does not provide much insight into how investors perceive their mutual fund investment. Second, from a practical perspective, the primary concern of mutual fund companies is likely to be the overall variability of investor cash flows, since this captures the burden that active investors place on fund companies and passive shareholders through trading.
2 Not surprisingly, many mutual fund companies have imposed redemption fees to discourage investors from strategically exploiting the liquidity provided to them. The first hypothesis is motivated by the assumption that investor preferences can be represented by a utility function defined over the moments of a portfolio's return distribution. This assumption is the basis of the standard finance paradigm, underlying, for example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964 ), Linter (1965 , and Mossin (1966) , in which utility is a function solely of expected return and variance.
When investors learn about expected return in a multi-period setting, then the standard finance paradigm can generate a mutual fund flow-performance relation and fund flow volatility. Berk and Green (2004) The first hypothesis implies that investors assess SR funds the same way that they assess other funds, as simply another candidate investment for the portfolio optimization problem. If so, then after controlling for other relevant variables such as fund age and fund size, the flow-performance sensitivity and fund flow volatility of SR funds will equal that of conventional funds.
Hypothesis 2:
The flow-performance relation of SR funds is stronger than that of conventional funds.
The second hypothesis can also be motivated by the standard finance paradigm, with the additional assumption that prior beliefs regarding the expected return of SR funds are more diffuse than prior beliefs about conventional funds. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) The assumption is also consistent with Statman (1999) , who argues that, in contrast to the standard paradigm, behavioral finance views the investment decision as a type of product choice, so that "value-expressive" characteristics of an asset affect its desirability.
Admittedly, there is no evidence in the existing finance literature to suggest that investors pay attention to attributes unrelated to performance. A survey of mutual fund investors in Capon et al. (1996) , for example, asks investors to reveal which criteria they use to select funds. On a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 5 (extremely important), Investment
Performance Track Record received a mean of 4.62, whereas Community Service/Charity
Record received a 1.09. My sample, though, represents a group of investors with a revealed preference for SR funds, and one purpose of this paper is to determine whether the SR attribute by itself is important for this group. One can also distinguish between the two explanations for the second hypothesis by measuring the difference between SR funds and conventional funds as funds age. If SR investor behavior is governed by preferences that are represented by a multi-attribute utility function, then differences between SR funds and conventional funds should persist. If SR investor behavior is instead governed by rational learning with diffuse priors, then differences between SR funds and conventional funds should disappear over time as the precision of prior beliefs converge. Following Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , I
examine the flow-performance relation and fund flow volatility for subsets of our sample split by the age of the fund. Young funds are defined as those aged five years or less, whereas mature funds are those aged six years or more.
Hypothesis 3:
The flow-performance relation of SR funds is weaker than that of conventional funds, and the fund flow volatility of SR funds is lower than that of conventional funds.
The third hypothesis can also be motivated two ways. The first motivation is the assumption that preferences of SR investors can be represented by a multi-attribute utility function defined over the moments of a portfolio's return distribution and a variable representing whether the investment decision is SR, as before, except now the utility function is additive in the attributes. As defined by Keeney and Raiffa (1993) , an additive utility function is permitted when attributes are utility independent, i.e. preferences for w < , and utility is less affected by a change in µ than for a conventional investor, for whom 1 w = . If this is the case, an SR investor will have less incentive to switch funds for a given change in µ than a conventional investor, and the flow-performance relation will be weaker in SR funds than conventional funds.
A weaker flow-performance relation would result in lower fund flow volatility. In addition, if SR investors have multi-attribute utility functions, then one can view investing in SR funds as consumption of the SR attribute. The asset pricing models of habit formation predict consumption smoothing. Abel (1990) , for example, derives a model in which utility of consumption is affected by levels of past consumption. The additive utility assumption, therefore, predicts that the volatility of fund flow is lower in SR funds than in conventional funds, resulting from consumption smoothing by SR investors.
A second assumption that leads to the same predictions of lower fund flow volatility and a weaker flow-performance relation is that at least some SR capital is directed by a clientele with a long-term horizon. 
II. Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the data used in the study. In the empirical analysis, I create a matched sample of SR and conventional funds based in part on the funds' risk exposures. To estimate these, I require monthly returns of the market index, the Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market factors, a momentum factor, and a risk-free security. 9 The equity series are constructed from the CRSP equity database, and I represent the risk-free rate by the 90-day U.S. Treasury Bill Discount from Datastream (code TBILL90). Table 1 lists the number of funds, the average and median year-end total net assets per fund, and the average and median age of the funds, year-by-year, for equity funds in the CRSP database. 8 To ensure that the procedure is reasonable, I compare year-by-year the total net assets of equity funds in the CRSP database, following our classification scheme, to the total net assets of equity funds as reported by the Investment Company Institute (2003) . In unreported tests, the two series track each other closely, indicating that the procedure conforms to a standard classification of funds. 9 The Fama-French and momentum factors were obtained from Ken French's website. 10 The CRSP database appears to have a year-2000 problem affecting some of its records of the year in which a fund is founded. Over 800 funds are reported as being founded in years 1900, 1901, 1902, or 1903 . However, the oldest mutual fund is typically recognized as the MFS Massachusetts Investors Trust, founded in 1924. So, for those funds with a foundation year of 1900 -1903, 100 years was added to their foundation year. 11 The number of funds is larger than reported elsewhere since CRSP has separate records for each share class of a mutual fund. In 2002, for example, ICI reports 4,756 equity funds versus the 8,009 reported in Table 2 .
funds in 2001. Figure 1 depicts the growth in the mutual fund industry. Even though the SR category is just a few percent of the size of the overall mutual fund industry, its growth, both in terms of the number of funds and total assets under management, generally tracks the overall industry. Figure 2 shows the value-weighted average return of the conventional and SR funds year-by-year. These two series are similar, though there are large differences in returns in the late 1990's. 
III. Empirical Methodology and Results
This section describes the empirical methodology and presents the results. Subsection A reviews the procedure used to infer fund flow. Subsection B explains the construction of a control group. Subsection C reports the estimates of fund flow volatility. Subsection D shows the flow-performance regression analysis. Subsection E discusses robustness tests.
A. Fund Flow
Fund flow can be computed directly from a record of shareholder activity, as in Warther (1995) and Edelen (1999) , but is usually inferred from changes in a fund's total net assets and returns due to difficulty in obtaining reliable subscription and redemption data. I infer fund flow several ways. Let R i,t denote the holding period return for a mutual fund investor in fund i between times t and t -1, i.e.
(1) ( ) (2002), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and . These calculations assume all flow occurs at the end of the period. Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Zheng (1999) also compute flows assuming they occur at the beginning of the period: This figure depicts the growth of the entire industry: dollar fund flow is aggregated across funds, and this is divided by the beginning-of-year total net assets aggregated across funds. There is a common component to the time-series variation in SR and conventional fund flow. For this reason, the matching procedure described next ensures that the conventional funds I select for a control group are aligned in time with the SR funds.
B. Control Group
In order to measure the impact of the SR attribute on the behavior of SR investors relative to the behavior of investors in conventional funds, I need to control for other variables that might affect estimates of fund flow volatility and performance sensitivity.
Risk Exposures
Existing SR studies, including Luther et al. (1992) , Guerard (1997) , and , find differences in the risk exposures of SR and conventional funds. 14 These studies focus on performance, and naturally control for differences in risk. In my study, controlling for differences in risk is also important to ensure that any difference in investor behavior is due to the SR attribute rather than differences in portfolio composition.
14 Luther, Matatko, and Corner (1992) document a bias towards small capitalization stocks in their study of U.K. SR funds over the 1984 to 1990 period. Similarly, Guerard (1997) finds that those stocks screened from the Vantage Global Advisors universe of 1,300 stocks of are considerably larger and more valueoriented than stocks that pass the screens from 1990 to 1994. In contrast, Bauer et al. (2005) find that SR funds, both U.S. and international, tend to place greater weight on large stocks than conventional funds, resulting in a smaller exposure to the Fama and French (1993) small minus big factor than conventional funds.
There is some debate regarding which risk exposures affect fund flow. Gruber (1996) shows that fund flow is positively related to lagged abnormal returns as measured by both single-factor and multi-factor asset pricing models. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), however, show that Morningstar ratings subsume abnormal returns in the flowperformance relation for mutual funds. For robustness, I measure risk exposures using two models of returns. First, I measure exposure to market risk by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):
where R p is the return of fund p, R f is the riskless rate of return, and R M is the return of a market proxy. Second, I measure exposure to market risk, as well as the size, value, and momentum factors, using the following four factor model from Carhart (1997):
t f t p p M M t f t p SMB SMB t p HML HML t p UMD UMD t t R
where R SMB is the return of the size factor, R HML is the return of the value factor, and UMD R is the return of the momentum factor. Table 3 
Life Cycle
Another determinant of fund flow and the flow-performance relation that may cloud inference regarding SR and conventional funds is the general life cycle of mutual funds. As argued in Section I, a Bayesian investor may have a more diffuse prior belief regarding the expected performance of a young fund relative to the corresponding prior for an established fund, resulting in higher flow-performance sensitivity. Figure 4 shows for both the conventional funds ( Figure 4A ) and SR funds ( Figure 4B ) the 25 th , 50 th , and 75 th percentile values of the cross-sectional distribution of fund flow F for fund-years defined by the age of the fund. In both figures, the distribution is characterized by lower values as funds age. The median for conventional funds is approximately 25 percent at age three, for example, and close to zero at age six. Clearly, I need to control for age since SR and conventional funds may differ in performance sensitivity not because of the SR attribute, but simply because the SR funds may in aggregate be younger or older than the other funds.
Related to age and its impact on the flow-performance relation is the size of a mutual fund. Sirri and Tufano (1998) , among others, show that smaller funds tend to 15 The tighter range of factor coefficients for SR funds is consistent with the argument in Geczy et al. (2003) that SR funds offer less opportunity than conventional funds for exposure to risk factors. This hampers the performance of portfolios of SR funds relative to the performance of portfolios of conventional funds in their analysis as a result.
attract larger percentage inflows, suggesting that as funds increase in size, the relation between flow and performance may weaken. To control for life cycle effects, then, I match SR and conventional funds by age and fund size, as described next.
Matching Procedure
One approach to control for variables that may explain the dynamics of fund flow is to include additional explanatory variables in the regression analysis. However, the assumption of linearity may be inappropriate, as evidenced by the relation between fund flow and fund age in Figure 4 . An alternative approach is to construct a matched sample of SR and conventional funds. I use two matching procedures, corresponding to the two models of risk described above. percent at the median, for example. The interpretation is that a $100 million fund experiences monthly flows with standard deviation of about $8 million for the SR funds and $10 million for the conventional funds. The sample means are higher than the medians, 11.74 percent for the SR funds versus 14.55 percent for the conventional funds, significantly different at the 10 percent level using a t-test for means. These findings indicate that SR fund flow is economically and statistically significantly less variable than that of conventional funds.
C. Volatility of Monthly Fund Flows
As mentioned in the prior subsection, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) In the next subsection, I investigate the flow-performance relation in SR funds to make the inference more precise.
D. Flow Performance Relation
Analysis of the flow-performance relation requires specifying a response function; in particular, I need to specify how many lags of performance to include. This choice specifies the horizon over which investors measure performance. In order to avoid misspecifying the response function, I estimate the relation between annual fund flow and performance lagged one year. This can be viewed as the aggregate response over the course of a year to a fund's prior-year performance.
16
I estimate OLS parameters of the following flow-performance regression: 16 Gruber (1996) finds that fund flow is also related to performance lagged two years. I only include performance lagged one year to focus attention on the information provided by the most recent observation in the context of Bayesian updating. To be included in the regression analysis, an observation of fund flow must be from a fund with at least $10,000,000 of total net assets in the two successive years used to compute the flow, consistent with the procedure in Chevalier and Ellison (1997) . This eliminates extremely small funds which may exhibit explosive growth and distort the results. I also discard observations of fund flow prior to 1980, since the number of funds in the pre-1980 time period is quite small. The results are robust to changes in this cutoff. The asymmetric difference between SR funds and conventional funds is not consistent with any of the three hypotheses discussed in Section I. All of the motivating assumptions predict a symmetric difference: either the flow-performance relation would be stronger or weaker in SR funds than conventional funds, for both positive and negative performance. Prior research has documented similar asymmetries. As mentioned in Section I, a standard result in the flow-performance literature is that poor performers are not punished with outflows to the same extent that superior performers are rewarded with inflows. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory provides one explanation for the asymmetric response to performance by assuming that investor attitudes are described as risk-seeking in the region of losses and risk-averse in the region of gains.
Alternatively, Lynch and Musto (2003) argue that investors may expect that management companies will replace managers of poorly performing funds, and may anticipate expected returns to increase as a result.
As listed in Table 5 , three results stand out when observations are split by fund age. First, for both young funds and mature funds, the sensitivity of SR fund flow to positive lagged returns is still approximately twice that of conventional fund flow. This supports the assumption of a conditional utility function because a utility-based explanation predicts differences between SR funds and their conventional counterparts persist over time. Second, for mature funds, the sensitivity of SR fund flow to negative lagged returns is insignificantly different from zero, whereas the sensitivity of conventional fund flow to negative lagged returns is a statistically significant 0.6673.
Both these results are consistent with the full sample. Third, for young funds, the sensitivities of SR and conventional funds to lagged negative returns are similar in magnitude and neither is significantly different from zero.
Panel B lists results for the four-factor match. In all cases the coefficients magnitudes and significance levels are consistent with the CAPM match. This result indicates that the differences between SR funds and their conventional counterparts cannot be explained by any differences in risk exposure.
E. Robustness Tests
In unreported analysis, I rerun the flow-performance tests on subsets of the data split two ways. Table 6 shows the results. In almost all cases, the coefficients are smaller, which is consistent with the procedure putting less weight on the tails, but the qualitative inference is the same as in the OLS analysis.
An analysis of the demographic characteristics of SR investors, and a comparison to the demographics of investors in conventional funds, may provide additional insight regarding the behavior of SR investors. While I am unaware of any published research concerning the demographics of SR investors, private conversations with the research staffs at two large SR fund companies revealed that SR mutual fund investors are significantly more likely to be female, highly educated, and have lower income than investors in conventional funds. To the extent that one expects educated, female investors to be less prone to an overconfidence bias than other investors (see Barber and Odean (2001) ), one may expect them to trade less, thereby generating lower fund flow volatility.
Unfortunately, investment companies are reluctant to reveal information regarding their shareholders, so I am unable to generate and test empirically more detailed hypotheses regarding investor behavior. However, even with the observable aggregate flow data, significant differences between SR and conventional investors are apparent.
IV. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the dynamics of investor fund flows in a sample of socially screened equity mutual funds. SR funds feature significantly lower monthly fund flow volatility than conventional funds. This result suggests that the extra-financial SR attribute serves to dampen the rate at which SR investors trade mutual funds.
I also compare the relation between annual fund flows and lagged performance in SR funds to the same relation in a matched sample of conventional funds. For the 1980 through 2002 period, SR investors exhibit a significantly larger response to positive returns than investors in conventional funds, but a smaller response to negative returns than investors in conventional funds. Furthermore, the differences between SR funds and their conventional counterparts are robust over time and persist as funds age. Taken together, the evidence suggests that preferences of SR investors can be represented by a conditional multi-attribute utility function, in the sense that they appear to derive utility from being exposed to the SR attribute, especially when SR funds deliver positive returns.
Mutual fund companies, which continually compete to offer new funds in an effort to attract investor capital, can expect SR investors to be more loyal than investors in ordinary funds. My results should extend to other sectors of the mutual fund industry characterized by specific extra-financial attributes -I leave tests of generality to future research.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Listed are the number, median and average size (in USD millions), and median and average age, by year, of equity mutual funds in the CRSP database for years 1980 through 2002. A fund is included in a given year if it has positive year-end total net assets. A fund is considered an equity fund if the fraction of assets invested in equities reaches at least 75 percent while the fund is in the database. "SR" refers to those funds identified as socially responsible by the Social Investment Forum. "Conventional" refers to all other equity funds. , and 75 th percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of monthly volatility of percentage fund flows for two samples of equity mutual funds taken from the CRSP database. "All" shows results when flow volatility is computed over a fund's entire life; "Young" shows results when flow volatility is computed for fund age five years or less; and "Mature" shows results when flow volatility is computed for fund age six years or greater. Also shown are the averages and two-sided p-value of t-tests for a significant difference. "SR" refers to those funds identified as socially responsible by the Social Investment Forum. "Matched" refers to a subset of all other equity funds, and consists of three conventional funds for each SR fund matched on size, age, start date, and the β coefficients from the four factor model. To be included in the analysis, a volatility estimate must contain at least 12 consecutive months of flow data. 4 i,t-1 = 1 if fund i is SR and has a negative lagged return and zero otherwise, and R is return. "SR" refers to those funds identified as socially responsible by the Social Investment Forum. "All" shows results when observations are included from a fund's entire life; "Young" shows results when only observations for fund age five years or less are included; and "Mature" shows results when only observations for fund age six years or greater are included. Panel A shows results when each annual observation of an SR fund is matched to annual observations of three conventional funds where the match is based on age, start date, size, and CAPM β . Panel B shows the results when the match is based on age, start date, size, and the four β coefficients from the four factor model. 4 i,t-1 = 1 if fund i is SR and has a negative lagged return and zero otherwise, and R is return. "SR" refers to those funds identified as socially responsible by the Social Investment Forum. "All" shows results when observations are included from a fund's entire life; "Young" shows results when only observations for fund age five years or less are included; and "Mature" shows results when only observations for fund age six years or greater are included. Panel A shows results when each annual observation of an SR fund is matched to annual observations of three conventional funds where the match is based on age, start date, size, and CAPM β . Panel B shows the results when the match is based on age, start date, size, and the four β coefficients from the four factor model. Figure 1A shows the total number of equity funds in the CRSP database with positive year-end total net assets, by year. Figure 1B shows the total net assets of equity funds in the CRSP database with positive year-end total net assets, by year. "SR" refers to those funds identified as socially responsible by the Social Investment Forum. "Conventional" refers to all other equity funds. 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 
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Figure 1. Growth in the Mutual Fund Industry
